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Abstract
Environmental stochasticity and climate affect outcomes in evolutionary games, which can
thereby affect biological diversity. Our maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of replicator
dynamics for morph frequency data from control (25 years) and three experimentally per-
turbed populations (14 years) of side-blotched lizards yield a 3 × 3 payoff matrix in the gener-
alized Rock-Paper-Scissors family; it has intransitive best replies, and each strategy is its
own worst reply. ML estimates indicate significant interactive effects of density and tempera-
ture on morph frequency. Implied dynamics feature a powerful interior attractor and recover
(for the first time) observed 4-5 year oscillations. Our evolutionary experiment on morph fre-
quency confirms that oscillations are driven by frequency dependent selection, but climate
entrains the cycles across the perturbed and control populations within 10 generations.
Applying the model across the species range, we find that climate also accounts for morph
fixation and mating system diversity, suggesting climate may similarly impact ecosystem
diversity.
Introduction
Frequency dependent selection occurs when biological fitness depends on relative prevalence
of alternative strategies. A famous example occurs among throat-color morphs of side-
blotched lizards, where despotic orange defeats cooperative blue, which defeats sneaker yellow,
which defeats orange, in rock-paper-scissors (RPS) cycles [1]. Game theory has been applied
to understand the role of frequency dependent selection in diverse biological systems [2] [3],
[4]. The basic idea is to summarize the fitness impact of morph j on morph i in a n × n payoff
matrix W = ((Wij))i,j = 1,. . .,n. Previous work with the side-blotched lizard, Uta stansburiana
focused on siring success using bivariate analysis.
Do we indeed get RPS cycles when we take a broader view of fitness? In this paper we
exploit a novel experimentally perturbed data set and new statistical techniques to re-examine
payoff matrices and morph dynamics among side-blotched lizards. The new results confirm
the basic cyclic domination pattern of RPS, but the dynamics provide new insight into the
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relatively short observed cycles. The estimation results have implications for the impact of cli-
mate on diversity at both short and long spatial scales.
The data set includes a natural population of side-blotched lizards called Main World
(MW) for which we have a continuous record of morph frequency from 1990-2013. It also
includes three experimental populations. In 1999 we seeded three rock outcrops with progeny
from controlled laboratory crosses, and designated them as Orange World (OW), Blue World
(BW) and Yellow World (YW) based on the color allele that was made most common [5].
Experimentally altering morph frequencies to different frequencies in a single year allows us to
identify impacts of exogenous factors like weather on the temporal / spatial autocorrelation
among populations. Data are plotted in Fig 1, and are available as S1 Data.
Empirical work to date has relied mainly on bivariate analysis, e.g., the siring success of
each male morph is regressed on the frequency of the alternative morphs in the immediate
neighborhood, and the estimated coefficients are reported as the rows of the payoff matrix [1],
[6]. Here we present new methods for estimating payoff matrices, using the time series of allele
frequencies in the overall population and a broader definition of fitness that subsumes all fac-
tors that may change the male morph frequencies from one generation to the next. We obtain
maximum likelihood estimates for a structural model in which changes in allele frequencies
are governed by standard discrete time replicator dynamics, together with stochastic distur-
bances following a Dirichlet distribution. Natural extensions of the structural model allow us
to estimate the impact of exogenous covariates such as heat spells [7] that might limit progeny
recruitment in a morph specific fashion, and endogenous covariates such as a female popula-
tion density game that is linked to the male RPS game [8]. In S1 Text we present further exten-
sions, e.g., to logistic and other error structures, and to biparental models of trait transmission.
The new payoff matrix estimates differ qualitatively from earlier estimates using less inclusive
techniques, and imply that climate synchronizes populations at small spatial scales (reducing
diversity), but accounts for morph fixation and mating system diversity at large scales.
Color expression on the throat and flanks of male and female side-blotched lizards appears
to have a simple Mendelian pattern of inheritance in which color alleles additively contribute
to phenotype [9]; supporting evidence includes controlled laboratory crosses [5], field pedigree
[10], [11], linkage disequilibrium gene mapping studies [12] and theoretical models [13].
Males with orange alleles (oo, bo, yo) express an aggressive phenotype and patrol large territo-
ries with many females. The aggressive orange strategy is vulnerable to invasion by sneaker
males with yellow alleles (by, yy, yo), which are female mimics and can cuckold the orange
males by visiting females in their harems. The strategy of yellow is beaten by the mate guarding
and cooperative strategy of blue males (bb, by) that defend adjacent territories, but aggressive
orange beats blue to create a rock-paper-scissors evolutionary dynamic. Current evidence sug-
gests that male heterozygotes express intermediate phenotypes [12] as perceived also by
females in mate choice studies [9]. Here we model additive genetic effects of color alleles on
phenotype payoffs, in both replicator and diploid sexual models.
Materials and methods
Data
Primary raw data are annual counts of individual males (and females in diploid models), by
genotype and location, gathered as part of annual censuses of all adult Uta. Since 1990 the cen-
sus has covered MW, consisting of connected rock outcroppings covering approximately 1.59
hectares near Los Banos California, and since 2000 it has also covered three separate experi-
mental locales (OW 4.24 hectares, BW 1.20 hectares and YW 7.23 hectares). Censuses record
the OBY allele expressed in each mature male and each mature female (included in the census
Evolutionary games, climate and the generation of diversity
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184052 August 31, 2017 2 / 14
data if they survived up to an ovarian stage when females are fertilized, follicles 5mm, or
later). We also estimated color allele frequency for the OW (fo = 0.52, fb = 0.16, fy = 0.32), YW
(fo = 0.26, fb = 0.18, fy = 0.56), and BW (fo = 0.17, fb = 0.44, fy = 0.39) in 1999 from the predicted
distribution of color alleles in progeny, because they were produced from controlled laboratory
crosses [5]. These three worlds were named for the allele we made most prevalent in the initial
progeny cohort.
Color expression begins in early March as males establish territories and peaks in early
April, but the four locales are slightly out of breeding synchrony, with expression of color (and
reproduction) initiated first in OW, then MW, BW, and YW. Accordingly, we counted popu-
lations in that order, ensuring that males had nearly full color expression on the first census.
We also carried out second and third censuses at monthly intervals to estimate the number
males missed on the first pass [10], from which we infer that the count includes approximately
98% of male recruits and 97% of female recruits, i.e., surviving males or females hatched since
the previous year’s census. Full expression of female color occurs when they have oviductal
eggs, 2 weeks after full male color expression (e.g., when females are receptive and ready for
fertilization, follicles 5mm), so we held two staged captures, focussing on both sexes early
and females only later as they ovulated follicles, or had near-term follicles just prior to ovula-
tion (follicles 8mm). There are also a few males and females that survive for two or more sea-
sons, but U. stansburiana is largely an annual at Los Banos.
Fig 1. OBY allele panel. Fractions of observed OBY alleles observed among males in four Uta stansburiana
populations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184052.g001
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The 6-element vector (Noo, Nob, . . ., Nyy) of male genotype data for a given year and location
can be reduced to a 3-vector of allele counts used in the replicator model for male genotype
frequency simply by taking the obvious weighted sums (see Table O in S1 Text), e.g., No =
2Noo + Nob + Noy. The allele shares are then computed by dividing each component of (No, Nb,
Ny) by the sum N of the allele counts. Due to diploidy, the population size is n = N/2, and the
density covariate for each location is defined as n minus its historical mean for that location.
Alternatively, the set of two six-element vectors comprising genotypes of both sexes can be
used in full diploid sexual model, assuming Mendelian transmission and additive effects of
alleles on male phenotype payoffs. One can also compute genotypic shares (frequency) by
dividing each component by the population size, which here is simply the sum n = Noo + Nbo +
Nyo + Nbb + Nby + Nyy, for a given sex.
We used weather records collected at the California Department of Forestry Station on
Gonzaga Road from 1986-2012 (station LBN: 37.053 N, 121.049 W, only 7.33 km from the
main population), to estimate hourly temperature records throughout the year. However, two
years (1989, 1992) were missing summer records so we interpolated data from an adjacent LSB
station (Los Banos Dam site; 36.994 N, 120.93 W, and 10.77 km from the main population):
we regressed the LBN station data on contemporaneous data from the LSB station and then
used the fitted equation to predict the two missing data points.
For each month, we computed number of hours of restriction [7], termed hr, when Tair >
Tpreferred = 37.4 C [14]. The idea is to estimate restricted activity spells due to high air tempera-
tures, which might impact recruitment and survival, and may affect some color morphs more
than others. Their small size ( 0.5 g) means that hatchlings will be close to thermal equilib-
rium with the air temperature, particularly because they spend much of their time in shade as
the temperature warms, finally retreating entirely at mid-day during the summer when tem-
peratures exceed Tpreferred.
Statistical procedures
We fit the data to structural models estimated via maximum likelihood (ML) techniques. The
models join discrete time replicator dynamics to a stochastic structure given by the Dirichlet
distribution or, alternatively, by the logistic distribution. The goal is to estimate a 3×3 fitness
(or payoff) matrix W = ((Wij))i,j=1,2,3.
The first step is to take raw census counts (considering for the moment one locale) of adult










. Thus the main data input is a T × 3 matrix that lists the state vector S(t) = (S1(t),
S2(t), S3(t)) each period t = 1, . . ., T. Each population state S(t) lies in the simplex, the two
dimensional triangle S ¼ fðs1; s2; s3Þ 2 R
3 : si  0;
P
isi ¼ 1g.
Fitness Wi(t) = Wi  S(t) ∑j Wij Sj(t) of morph i = 1, 2, 3 at time t is simply its weighted
average fitness against current population frequency. Thus mean fitness at time t is





replicator dynamics (continuous time: [15]; discrete time: [2]) give the next period population
state Zðt þ 1Þ 2 S that would arise absent stochastic disturbances, and are specified by the dif-
ference equation




Our model’s stochastic specification is novel in some respects but it is rooted in first princi-
ples. Here we sketch the main ideas; see S1 Text for details. The best known stochastic
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specification, adding a normally-distributed error to deterministic dynamics, unfortunately
leads to nonsensical results for the simplex: the components of the state vector generally do
not sum to 1.0 and may be negative. Truncations and renormalizations can push the state back
into S, but then one no longer can rely on the nice properties of the normal distribution. The
multinomial logit model is a viable alternative, but it is difficult to recover structural parame-
ters from its estimated coefficients.
For the simplex S, the natural stochastic specification involves the Dirichlet distribution,
Dir(ηZ) with parameters η and Z = (z1, z2, z3). This distribution has the following density func-
tion over ðx1; x2; x3Þ 2 S:






3 Ix2S ; ð2Þ
where I is the indicator function which is 0 outside the simplex and 1 on the simplex, and the
normalizing constant K(ηZ) ensures that density integrates to 1. The intuition is as follows.
Suppose that there is an urn with an infinite number of orange, blue and yellow balls of
unknown proportions, and we observe a finite sample of η> 0 independent random draws
from that urn. If the fractions of orange, blue, and yellow balls in that sample are Z = (z1, z2,
z3), then the likelihood that the actual fractions in the urn were (x1, x2, x3) is given by density
function (2). In technical jargon, Z has a multinomial distribution and the Dirichlet is the con-
jugate prior distribution.
Thus we complete the structural model via S(t + 1) * Dir(ηZ(t + 1)), where η> 0 is the
effective sample size of breeding adult males. That is, the deterministic replicator dynamics
would give the next state precisely if the lizard population sizes were infinite, but given sam-
pling error the distribution of a finite size population has a particular distribution. By well-
known properties of the Dirichlet distribution (e.g., Kotz et al. 2000), we can say that Si(t + 1),
the next generation fraction of morph i, is a random variable with mean Zi(t + 1) as specified




Mathematical and biological principles constrain the parameters we seek to estimate. Each
fitness matrix entry Wij 0 because, even when most prevalent, a morph j at worst can drive
fitness (and thus next period’s share) of morph i to zero; negative shares are not possible. Sto-
chastic disturbances are constrained to keep the state vector within the simplex, but the Dirich-
let distribution automatically enforces that constraint. Since matrix entries appear in both the
numerator and denominator of Eq (1), there is no effect when we multiply all matrix entries
by an arbitrary constant c> 0. Hence we need to normalize the matrix, and do so via the con-






Additionally, we can augment the regression with covariates that capture time- or world-
specific shifts in the fitnesses. Probably the most important time-specific covariate is tempera-
ture, for which we use tkðtÞ ¼ hrðtÞ   hkr , a measure of temperature restriction the previous
summer (when progeny are recruiting) normalized for each world k by subtracting the histori-
cal mean value hkr over the life of that world. For world-specific shifts we take νk(t), the male
population size in world k in year t, normalized by subtracting its world-specific mean value.
We assume that these covariates shift fitness multiplicatively, with the proportional change in
fitness coefficient a linear function of each variable. Thus we will estimate the generously
parameterized fitness matrices Ok = ((Oijk))i,j=1,. . .,3 where
OijkðtÞ ¼Wij exp ðb
n
ij  nkðtÞ þ b
t
ij  tkðtÞÞ ð3Þ
The normalization of ν and τ ensures that we have Ok(t) = W when both variables are at their
average levels. In the most complete specification, therefore, in addition to the 3×3 fitness
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matrix W we are also estimating two other 3×3 coefficient matrices: βν for population density
effects and βτ for temperature effects.
Substituting Ok for W in Eq (1), one sees again that the βmatrices need normalization. A
natural choice is that the coefficients sum to zero. Thus estimation of Eq (3) is subject to the











Ignoring the covariates for the moment, we seek to estimate parameter vector
θ = (η, W11, W12, . . ., W33), under the maintained assumption that the observed state S(t)
has the distribution Dir(ηZ(t)), where Z(t) is the row vector of 3x3 deterministic replicator
dynamics. Thus ZiðtÞ ¼
Wiðt  1Þ
W ðt  1Þ Siðt   1Þ. Given the previous state S(t − 1), the conditional den-
sity of the current state is













Summing the log of the right hand side of Eq (4) over t = 1, . . ., T, the conditional log-likeli-
hood function of the sample is:





½  lnGðZZiðtÞÞ þ ln SiðtÞðZZiðtÞ   1Þ ð5Þ
The t = 1 terms do not contribute to the sum since, with no previous period to which to apply
replicator dynamics, their likelihood is 1. We maximized the right hand side of Eq (5) numeri-
cally over the set of parameter values θ = (η, W11, W12, . . ., W33) satisfying η> 0, Wij 0, and
P3
i;j¼1 Wij ¼ 1. The numerical maximization is via Matlab’s active set algorithm fmincon,
using as initial values 1/9 for each entry Wij of the payoff matrix and 20 for η. The algorithm
converged reasonably quickly to the values reported in the Results section for a range of other
initial values, e.g., for η between 15 and 30. The Matlab code is in S1 Code.
Extending the basic model to include covariates and panel data is conceptually straightfor-
ward. To deal with 4 separate locations (“worlds”) we write the conditional log-likelihood
function for location k as:





½  lnGðZZikðtÞÞ þ ln SikðtÞðZZikðtÞ   1Þ ð6Þ
Note that η and the Wij’s are not location-specific because, to keep the number of free parame-
ters small relative to overall sample size, we assume that the underlying stochastic structural
model is the same in all locations. Of course stochastic realizations can and do vary across loca-
tions. Adding the covariates ν and τ affects the likelihood function only through the (determin-
istic) replicator dynamic equation for Zik(t), where the payoff matrix W is replaced by the
augmented fitness matrix Ok(t) defined in Eq (2) of the text.
We now assume that stochastic realizations are conditionally independent, i.e., conditional
on Sik(t − 1) and other covariates, the Sik(t)’s are independent across k. Then the augmented




where ln ℓk is defined in Eq (6) using the augmented fitness matrices Ok in the replicator
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ij 2 ½  200; 200 in the diploid
sexual model mentioned in the next paragraph), but these constraints never bind once the
algorithm approaches convergence.
S1 Text discusses a more complex diploid sexual model. It employs a fairly general expres-
sion for diploid genotype selection and transmission adapted from [16], [17] (Chapters 5 and
14), [13] and [18]. We consider a purely additive genetic model of transmission, which is most
analogous to the simple replicator described above.
The discussion below of dynamic implications presumes several properties of equilibria,
e.g., that the payoff matrix Ôkt  OkjtkðtÞ;nkðtÞ has a unique stable interior equilibrium when the
temperature and density covariates (τk(t), νk(t)) are sufficiently close to zero. That discussion is
justified by three known analytic results (see, for example, [19]) about equilibria of symmetric
games specified by an arbitrary n × n payoff matrix W: (a) If it lies in the interior of the sim-
plex, the vector S = cW−11 is a (mixed) Nash equilibrium, where 1 is the vector of 1’s and the
normalizing constant satisfies c−1 = 1 W−1  1. Moreover, if the payoff matrix has cyclic best
responses and each action is its own worst response, then (b) S is the only NE and it indeed
lies in the simplex interior, and (c) S is also an ESS, hence dynamically stable.
Results
Fig 2A presents the basic ML estimates, which assume that the same fitness matrix applies each
year in each world. Note that (to a good degree of confidence) the highest entry in column 1 is
W13 0.17, indicating that strategy 3 (yellow, sneaker) is the best reply to strategy 1 (orange,
aggressive). Likewise the data confirm that strategy 2 (blue, bourgeois) is the best reply to 3,
and that strategy 1 is the best reply to 2. Thus estimates confirm the RPS best reply cycle. How-
ever, the estimated matrix is what [6] call an apostatic RPS (rather than pure RPS) in that each
strategy is its own worst reply.
A more complete model for the replicator allows covariates to amplify (or diminish) each
payoff matrix entry. A priori, the most important covariates appear to be population density
that year (relative to its time average level for that world), and temperature as captured in a
measure of excessive heat during the key time period. ML fits of this more complete model
appear in Fig 2B, 2C and 2D. The apostatic RPS structure remains after including the covari-
ates, while the constraint Woo 0 no longer binds, perhaps due to negative effect that higher
temperatures have on orange when prevalent. The main density effects are (a) negative for all
morphs when orange is prevalent, as would be expected for the despotic orange strategy [20],
and (b) positive for orange when yellow is prevalent, possibly indicating a fitness boost for
orange when it is rare and conditions are conducive to a large population. The strongest tem-
perature effect is a boost to yellow when it is prevalent. Covariates are jointly highly significant
according to the standard likelihood ratio test. The main results hold up under a variety of
robustness checks (Table M in S1 Text).
As a final robustness check we also estimated two versions of the diploid sexual model, one
using male genotype frequencies as data for both male and female genotypes, and the other
using observed male and female genotype frequencies. Analysis of the diploid sexual model,
restricting analysis to the male genotype frequencies, recovers similar payoffs as observed in
the replicator model (Table Q in S1 Text), and inclusion of female genotype frequencies, addi-
tionally recovers a component of the blue enhancing its own fitness via cooperation (Table R
in S1 Text), a feature of the known dynamics of the Uta RPS [21], [10].
Evolutionary games, climate and the generation of diversity
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Returning to the featured replicator model, the estimated matrices have implications for
dynamic behavior. If the temperature and density covariates were always fixed at their average
levels, then the estimates in Fig 2B imply that from any interior initial condition (including the
large experimental perturbations to OW, BW and YW) the state would converge asymptoti-
cally and quite rapidly to the equilibrium S = λW−11 (0.38, 0.40, 0.22), via a counterclock-
wise swirl. Even for fairly extreme initial conditions, near a corner of the simplex but with each
morph share at least 0.1, it takes at most 5-8 years for the state to converge within sampling
error to S.
Of course, covariates are not fixed, and indeed vary stochastically from year to year and
across locations. Climate directly influences morph payoffs via progeny recruitment during
hot versus cool summers, and population density has an indirect influence. To assess the
impact, we compute the effective payoff matrix Ôkt for each World (k = MW, OW, BW, YW)
and each year t by amplifying or diminishing each payoff entry according to the density and
temperature variables experienced in that world that year. The blue dots in Fig 3 show drastic
year-to-year changes in the MW equilibrium, i.e., the Nash equilibrium (here, also the ESS) for
the payoff matrix ÔMt . In many years the equilibrium lies on an edge, indicating, under the
conditions experienced that year, that one morph (the one fixated at the corner of the simplex
opposite that edge) is in danger of local extinction.
We tested the proposition that climate can fix the game on an edge using published phylo-
geographic data on morph frequency collected across the range of the side-blotched lizard in
the United States and Mexico, in which we have observed 7 independent losses of the yellow
allele and two losses of the blue allele [22]. We estimated hours of temperature restriction (see
Fig 2. Estimates of the (W, βν, βτ) model (with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses). Matrix
entries are for strategies [1, 2, 3] = [o, b, y]. In Panel (a) the covariates are suppressed, and the estimated
effective sample size is Ẑ ¼ 21:7 3:4. The remaining panels show estimates of the full model, for which
Ẑ ¼ 34:2 1:2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184052.g002
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S1 Text), hr, using maximum daily air temperature, Tmax, obtained from worldclim.org, the
relationship between monthly Tmax and monthly hr at Los Banos, published data on body tem-
perature of Uta, Tb, across its range, and a published physiological model of climate forcing
relating hr to the difference between Tmax and Tb [7]. The predicted NE from our climate forc-
ing model of the RPS game, when driven by hr estimated in the local populations, accurately
predicts observed frequency of o alleles (F-test: F1,39 = 17.87, P< 0.0001), b alleles (F1,39 =
22.78, P< 0.0001) and y alleles (F1,39 = 5.48, P< 0.03) (Fig 4). Correlations between observed
and predicted frequency of o (P = 0.02) and b alleles (P = 0.003) are also significant using phy-
logenetic independent contrasts. Finally, the hours of restriction observed across the geo-
graphic range is negatively related to the observed frequency of orange (F1,39 = 9.98,
P< 0.004) but positively related to blue color strategies (F1,39 = 5.98, P< 0.03), and yellow
strategies (F1,39 = 8.21, P< 0.007), with the strategy yellow perilously close to fixation under
Fig 3. Simplex and states in all worlds. Black points and lines are time series S(t), while blue points are the Nash equilibrium for ÔxWt .
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184052.g003
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extremely cool conditions of hr found in northern populations or along the California Coast,
where orange is likewise strongly favored.
Discussion
To summarize, our first substantive finding is that the overall payoff matrix estimated for male
side-blotched lizards from one generation to the next is of the type called apostatic RPS [6]:
both rare strategies have higher fitness than the common strategy, and the best replies are
intransitive. Using subscripts {o, b, y} instead of {1, 2, 3} to denote the orange, blue and yellow
color morphs, the estimated fitness orderings are: Wyo>Wbo>Woo, Wob>Wyb>Wbb and
Wby>Woy>Wyy.
Previous estimates of the male lizards’ siring success using other methods [6] indicated a
pure RPS type of payoff matrix: Wyo>Woo>Wbo, Wob>Wbb>Wyb and Wby>Wyy>Woy.
The discrepancy relative to the previous estimates consists of reduced fitness for common
strategies. Indeed, our current estimates put all three common fitnesses (matrix entries along
the main diagonal) near zero.
How might the discrepancy arise? Mindful that previous estimates use a narrower notion of
fitness (siring success) than do current estimates (male offspring surviving to adulthood), we
can think of two plausible sources of the discrepancy. First, male hatchlings of the common
type may have lower first year survival rates, arising from strong selection against self geno-
types exerted either by surviving adult males that are still present when progeny emerge or by
the progeny themselves as they establish territories [23], [24]. Second, as argued by [16],
females may prefer rare male genotypes [18], [25], and more frequently select their sperm [26],
[6], chose them as mates [9], [27], incur incubation mortality due to mismatch of co-adapted
gene complexes [24], or as suggested by [28], females may selectively produce female progeny
when the common male strategy is disadvantaged and the rare strategies are advantaged in the
progeny generation. Because adult male density is highly correlated with female density (R2 =
0.63, t − value = 10.38, P< 0.0001, removing effect of world) and frequency [8] (results in S1
Text), many of these factors noted above associated with female genotypes will be sequestered
in the density covariate in our ML model.
The dynamic consequences of the new estimates deserve further comment. The picture
emerging from previous estimates of a stable pure RPS matrix was of a gradual inward coun-
terclockwise spiral perturbed a bit by noise. New estimates of an apostatic RPS instead imply
that unperturbed dynamics are highly stable swirls and a full counterclockwise cycle would
Fig 4. Geographic variation in the orange, blue and yellow strategy types and hours of restriction during juvenile emergence.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184052.g004
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converge precisely to the stable mix of three morphs. However, our second substantive finding
is that the covariates imply large perturbations in most years (indeed, the equilibrium is often
located on an edge of the simplex, Fig 3), so the system is chasing (with a typically counter-
clockwise approach) an erratic moving target.
Besides a better qualitative account of dynamics in each world separately, the new picture
can explain the observed approximate entrainment, in less than a decade, of the RPS cycle
across the four “worlds,” including all three that were experimentally perturbed to be
completely out of phase with the unperturbed control outcrop. Temperature, one of the two
covariates considered, perturbs the dynamic path similarly in each world each year, and thus
suggests entrainment.
This new picture of the evolutionary dynamics at a local scale also explains morph variation
across the geographical range of the side-blotched lizard. In northern populations longterm
climate variation pushes the NE close to the orange-blue edge of the simplex. Indeed, many
northern populations in both the Great Basin and the Coast Range of California exhibit fixa-
tion on orange and orange-blue combinations, with yellow being the most susceptible to selec-
tive loss [22]. This loss likely arises because yellow sires derive most paternity fitness from later
season clutches [26], but cooler and shorter seasons in northern populations removes the
advantage of yellow males, fixing on orange and orange-blue combinations. This process of cli-
mate-forced allele fixation generates considerable mating system diversity, as strategies are lost
the mating system collapses to ob or o states. However, large gradients in climate across the
spatial scale of the entire geographic range of the species can drive such allele fixation. For
example, the gradient in temperature from the Central Valley of the Coast Range of California
has resulted in the fixation of a trimorphic lineage to a monomorphic lineage, and a similar
change in gradient from NV to OR and UT has resulted in the fixation of a trimorphic lineage
to two different monomorphic lineages. Other fixations associated with cooler climate are also
found across the range [22].
One can imagine more sophisticated structural models of morph dynamics than considered
here. We have treated population density as exogenous, but surely it is partly endogenous and
a key aspect of female strategies [8]. One might also like to know more about different fitness
components, in particular, those arising from female mate preference, male siring success,
progeny survival, and sex ratio modulation [28]. S1 Text proposes a structural model of diploid
replicator dynamics with multiplicative components that account for these fitness compo-
nents. Beyond this, one can imagine structural models that incorporate nonlinearities assumed
away when a matrix is used to model fitness payoffs. However, currently available Uta data
comprise relatively short time series and a modest number of distinct populations, and thus
are inadequate for estimating models with far more parameters than ours. The diploid sexual
model does recover similar payoffs, when testing it with the same information as the replicator
model (e.g., male only genotypes), and the sexual model using male and female genotypes
additionally recovers aspects of the male game of cooperation involving blue alleles, also key
aspects of the Uta RPS reported in previous studies [21], [12]. Female Uta also carry the same
genes for finding self-similar genotypes, but instead of using them to enhance cooperation,
they are used in mate preference of blue females for blue males [12].
The techniques introduced here do seem widely applicable when the concern is overall fit-
ness rather than its components and when frequency dependent selection can be captured in a
payoff matrix. Inviting applications include bacterial RPS systems [29] and Y-linked RPS sys-
tems in fishes [30]. Our techniques can easily be specialized to two-morph systems such as the
spadefoot toad polyphenism [31], [32] when there are experimental or natural perturbations
that push the system away from equilibrium. In general, two strategy one-population games
are unlikely to cycle unless they involve density regulation, as with the r-K strategies of Uta
Evolutionary games, climate and the generation of diversity
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females noted earlier, or mammalian Chitty cycles [33]. Extensions of our techniques to more
than three morphs (e.g., five as in Poecilia parae; see Bourne et al. 2003) in a single population
seem straightforward, and we see no obstacle to applying them to frequency dependent selec-
tion in two or more interacting populations such as lynx-hare cycles [34], competition cycling
dynamics [35], or host-parasite cycling dynamics [36]. Given the analogous processes main-
taining diversity in mating systems and ecosystems [6], [35], our approach highlights the role
of climate in potentially reducing ecosystem diversity at small spatial scales, but enhancing
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